The Work of the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions -- The Elimination of Instructions by Kalven, Jr., Harry
Vol. 9, No.2 The University of Chicago Law School 21
The Work of the Illinois Supreme Court
Committee on Jury Instructions­
The Elimination of Instructions
by HARRY KALVEN, Jr.
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago
My job this afternoon before this very distinguished
audience is a curiously negative one. It is not so much
to tell you about some of the things the Committee
has done as it is to tell you about some of the things
the Committee has not done. In brief, I am to tell you
about the instructions we decided not to give.
In this connection I am reminded of a story about
Harry Bigelow, who some of you will recall as Dean
and a distinguished law teacher at the University of
Chicago Law School for many many years. On one
occasion it was Dean Bigelow's function to introduce
Lord Bertrand Russell at a Law School smoker. Lord
Russell, as you doubtless know, had been a pacifist
during World War I and had, I think, even gone to
jail over it. Dean Bigelow began his introduction
somewhat as follows. "Lord Russell has had a cele­
brated military career. He was the hero of the Battle
of West Moreland, he was wounded at Verdun, he
was awarded the D.S.O., ....
"
At about this point
the Dean was interrupted by a tug at his coat from
Lord Russell who audibly whispered "That must be
my brother, I was a pacifist." It appeared that the
Dean's secretary who had researched Lord Russell for
him had looked up the wrong Lord Russell. In this
crisis Dean Bigelow, who was a great Boston gentle­
man as well as a great scholar, with admirable aplomb
and without batting an eyelash, continued his intro­
duction-with one minor amendment. Before each
characteristic of Lord Russell's he now inserted the
word "not". "Lord Russell has not had a celebrated
military career. He was not the hero of the Battle of
West Moreland, he was not wounded at Verdun, he
was not awarded the D.S.O., ....
" The resulting in­
troduction was among the most effective I have ever
heard. I can only hope when I tell you the Committee
did not do this, the Committee did not do that, etc.
that mighty little word will stand me in half as good
a stead as it did Dean Bigelow.
I
There are of course an infinity of instructions the
Committee did not give. Let me then attempt to lo­
cate my topic a bit more precisely. There are three
different situations in which the Committee did not
recommend an instruction, only one of which is rel­
evant to my topic today. (1) On points we are affirm­
atively covering we have selected a Single preferred
version of the instruction and have not included alter­
native forms, as for example BAJI frequently does. In
this sense we have recommended against many forms
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of a given instruction. The selection of appropriate
language for an instruction is the most important func­
tion of the Committee and is a point to which Mr.
Snyder and Mr. Davidson will talk today. (2) Again
there are substantive points which we have not con­
sidered at all since the Committee's initial objective
is to prepare instructions only for the more urgent and
important issues in tort litigation. The fact that the
Committee has not considered a topic and has there­
fore not offered instructions on it does not, of course,
represent any judgment by the Committee as to the
merits of instructions on these issues. (3) Finally there
are points which we have considered and where, re­
gardless of how it would be worded, the Committee
recommends against any instruction. It is this activity
of the Committee which I shall sketch briefly for you
today.
The overall work of the Committee can be viewed
as having two aspects, an affirmative and a negative
one. The affirmative one is the drafting in model form
of instructions which should be given whenever ap­
propriate; the negative one is the vetoing or eliminat­
ing of certain instructions which on the Committee's
view are never appropriate and should never be given.
This rejecting of instructions has come to be one of
the important jobs of the Committee, and will, we
hope, turn out to be one of its major accomplishments.
The analogy here is perhaps to the weeding of a
choked garden. The elimination of the negative re­
commendations supports and complements the aim of
the affirmative drafts-to produce a select, quality
work product of carefully drafted, indispensable in­
structions. The aim, I would underscore, is to keep
our eye on the core of the communication problem
between the court and the jury.
At the risk of belaboring the point, I would em­
phasize once again how radical the stance of the Com­
mittee in this matter is. In most instances the Com­
mittee is not saying that the instructions rejected were
erroneous in law. Frequently the instructions rejected
have had the full sanction of appellate opinions and
of customary practice. The Committee is saying, how­
ever, that the mere fact that it is not error to give an
instruction does not necessarily qualify that instruc­
tion as one which should be retained in the basic
corpus of good instructions.
I will procede in a moment with a series of illustra­
tions of particular kinds of instructions the Committee
has rejected and of the policy considerations under­
lying such action, but let me pause first to note the
benefits that may flow from the veto policy the Com­
mittee has been using. There are at least four benefits
which have impressed us. First, the eliminating of a
large number of instructions has permitted the Com­
mittee to devote its attention in drafting to the instruc­
tions that matter the most, since time for drafting is a
scarce resource, even for so hard-working a committee
as this. Second, and this is a point which our jury
research at the University of Chicago tends to confirm,
the elimination of instructions will improve communi­
cation between the court and the jury since the in­
structions that matter will not be buried among a lot
of instructions which do not matter and which need
not be given. In brief the jury will not lose the forest
because of the trees, or to vary that metaphor, the
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jury will be able to see the important trees clearly and
cleanly. Third, the elimination of instructions should
save the lawyer time by simplifying his problem of
surveying the instruction field and of selecting the
instructions appropriate for his case. Finally, the elim­
ination of instructions should save time for both the
court and the lawyer by greatly simplifying the in­
struction conference between the court and counsel.
And in this respect once again we find the negative
function of eliminating instructions strongly comple­
menting the affirmative function of providing models.
In a jurisdiction where court congestion and calendar
delay are problems of the most serious magnitude, this
saving of trial time will in itself be a significant con­
tribution.
So much then for the general framework in which
the Committee's negative activity has been placed. I
do not have any exact count, but I would estimate
that roughly as much as 40 per cent of all full Com­
mittee time at our two-day monthly meetings have
been spent on instructions which were ultimately
54 The Law School Record Vol. 9, No.2
vetoed. I think it would be fair to say that in a
majority of cases where the Committee has finally
recommended against an instruction, the recommend­
ation has been made only after full discussion and
considerable argument. It has been a rare case indeed
in which the full Committee was immediately un­
animous in rejecting an instruction. I have become
increasingly impressed with what might be called the
"career line" of many of the rejected instructions. It
runs something like this. The instruction moves from
a first draft to a second draft to a third draft and then
only to oblivion as the Committee finally decides that
the difficulties experienced in drafting a satisfactory
instruction have revealed something about the sub­
stance of the instruction itself which makes it inap­
propriate or unnecessary in any case. Thus while the
Committee has thrown out many instructions, some of
them very familiar to you, it has done so not hastily
but only with all deliberate speed.
As I have reviewed instructions we have eliminated
and have reflected on our discussions about them,
there'emerges a series of policies which have more or
less explicitly guided the Committee's decisions and
which I shall now attempt to summarize briefly for
you. First, there have been a few cases in which we
thought the instruction would be erroneous as a mat­
ter of law and the rejection has been primarily on that
grounds. More interesting, there have been some cases
in which a majority of the Committee would strongly
predict that the law would within the next five years
change to conform to the rejected instruction. Never­
theless, in these cases the Committee has carefully ab­
stained from recommending the instruction because
it has not wished to lend its weight to changing sub­
stantive law. In other words, the Committee has
carefully kept its function from overlapping with that
of a law revision commission-and, I know this will
please this audience,-it has been aware most of the
time that there was some difference between its func­
tion and the function of the court.
Second, the Committee has been very conservative
about recommending instructions that are appropriate
only for the rare case and are likely to be a source of
error if used at all frequently. In these instances the
Committee has recommended against the instruction
because it has not wished to add momentum toward
the more frequent use of it.
Third, the Committee in general has rejected in­
structions which are themselves negative in that they
tell the jury not to do something. This is an interest­
ing and controversial point about instruction practice.
One might argue that the customary practice should
be radically revised and that a large number of nega­
tive instructions should be given which would caution
the jury against the most common jury misconceptions.
A persuasive analogy could be built from what is re-
garded as good practice in teaching, since teaching
might almost be defined as the progressive clearing
away of misconceptions. However, the Committee
decided to close the door against the liberal use of
negative instructions, influenced in part by some of
the jury researches at the University of Chicago which
tend to show that negative instructions may boomer­
ang and serve primarily to remind the jury of some­
thing it otherwise would not have thought of doing,.
much in the fashion of parent's instructions to chil­
dren.
Fourth, and this has been a very important guiding
policy, the Committee has been steadily against over
particularizing and has carefully refrained from creat­
ing a large number of specific instructions simply by
making applications of a good general instruction.
Here, I might add, we have been much more con­
servative about holding down the number of instruc­
tions than has BAJI.
Fifth, the Committee has been firmly against in­
structions which tend to single out a particular item
of evidence or to comment on it, and it has in general
rejected these even though they may have the ap­
proval of appellate court opinions.
Underlying all these considerations has been a ma­
jor policy. We have viewed the problem of commu­
nicating law to the jury and of instructing and orient­
ing them as one best handled by a partnership be­
tween the court and trial counsel rather than by the
court alone. Setting a proper balance between in­
structions of the court and argument of counsel has
emerged as a subtle and interesting problem and the
Committee's discussions have given it considerable
attention. There are some points which seem to us
better handled by permitting counsel on each side to
supply the adversary emphasis rather than by having
the court try to neutralize the instruction by sounding
first like the plaintiff counsel and then in the next
sentence like the defense counsel. On the other hand
there are times at which counsel is certainly entitled
to the protection of an instruction as legitimating in
the eyes of the jury the argument he is making. And
in any event neither the jury nor counsel should ever
lose sight of the cardinal principle that it is the court
which is the final arbiter on matters of law. But the
Committee, perhaps because there are so many very
able practicing lawyers on it, has, I think, given a dis­
tinctive emphasis to the role of counsel in communi­
cating the legal context to the jury. In brief, on many
occasions when the Committee has rejected an instruc­
tion it has felt not so much that the point ought not be
told to the jury but rather that it would be more
graceful and appropriate if it were told the jury by
counsel, and that therefore the point need not be kept
in the permanent body of model instructions.
I know that generalizations such as these can seem
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lifeless until made meaningful by illustration and ex­
ample. I should like now to review with you a few
specific examples of instructions the Committee has
rejected and indicate the tenor of the Committee's
thinking about them.
II
As a first example let me take Instruction No. 158-
BAJI, which deals with the failure to render first aid
when you and your automobile have been involved in
an accident. California appears to have read its hit
and run statute as creating a tort duty in this instance
but Illinois has not yet had occasion to pass on the
problem. While the Committee would predict that
Illinois would follow California when the question
arises, it has not wanted to place itself in a position
of forcing or leading the law and has therefore de­
cided against the inclusion of any instruction on this
topic.
Or again, consider No. 17gB in BAJI, which deals
with the duty of a patient to undergo an operation.
Here the Committee's rejection of an instruction on
the point illustrates the way in which several policies
tend to supplement each other. We think it is doubt­
ful under current Illinois law that the Court would
hold that the failure to undergo an operation on the
part of a plaintiff was so unreasonable as to bar dam­
ages, although here again one can anticipate a change
as the medical sophistication of the public increases.
At best the instruction was regarded as troublesome
and appropriate only for the rare case. Finally the
Committee is recommending a general instruction on
the duty to mitigate damages in a personal injury case
and it was thought this would be quite sufficient with­
out giving the operation question the emphasis of a
separate instruction.
Let me turn now to the instruction cautioning the
jury against rendering a quotient verdict (see for
example, BAJI No. 180). Here again several reasons
invite the rejection of any instruction on the point. It
is difficult to state the law here precisely. While it is
true that the jury should not bind itself by taking a
simple average and substituting that for the decision
process, it is also true that it is permissible and sensible
for the jury as a guide in its deliberation to strike an
average from time to time. Any instruction adequately
dealing with the point therefore is likely to be complex
and burdened with qualifications. At this point we
were persuaded that the instruction if given would
do more to suggest the possibility of an improper
quotient verdict than it would to prevent it. Here
again I might add with a note of pride, the jury re­
searches at the University of Chicago have been mild­
ly helpful.
Consider now an example such as the following:
If you believe (find) from the evidence that the plaintiff
and the defendant were both guilty of negligence which
proximately caused the injury (damage) complained of,
then you are instructed that you must not compare the
negligence of the plaintiff with that of the defendant for
in such case the plaintiff cannot recover.
Here again there was more than one reason which
dictated the Committee's rejection of the instruction,
although it is certainly a correct statement of law. The
Committee is of course recommending a model in­
struction on contributory negligence and the above
instruction would therefore be repetitious, would run
the risk of giving undue emphasis, and once again
also would run the risk of boomeranging and remind­
ing the jury of the possibilities of a sub rosa form of
comparative negligence.
This last example illustrates another criterion the
Committee has used. It is anxious to produce a set
of instructions which will not only meet the tests when
read as separate units but which will remain coherent
and satisfactory when put together. In brief the Com­
mittee is interested in providing instructions which
can be combined with the minimum of repetition and
the minimum of adjustment. Perhaps the most drama­
tic use of this principle has been in connection with
the instructions on personal injury damages, which I
have a particular fondness for because I was a mem­
ber of the sub-committee which prepared the drafts.
Here by using a general skeleton instruction and a
series of building blocks and by emphasizing the in­
ternal coherence of the series, it was possible to
achieve a startling reduction in the number of inde­
pendent instructions. To use once again as a whip­
ping boy BAJI, which I should hasten to say the entire
Committee greatly admires and has found invaluable,
we required just 13 instructions paragraphs to cover
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the same ground for which BAJI required 54 instruc­
tions covering 70 pages of text.
Let me turn now to another familiar example, the
instruction cautioning the jury that the fact that the
court has given instructions on damages is not to be
taken as any intimation by the court of the defendant's
liability. Her again the instruction is certainly accu­
rate as a statement of law and there is some slight risk
that the jury from time to time might misinterpret the
meaning of the court's giving an instruction on dam­
ages. But here the Committee's feeling that instruc­
tions should not be over particularized came into play.
The Committee felt that if it were appropriate to cau­
tion the jury specially about the implication of the
court giving this instruction, it would be equally ap­
propriate to give a companion caution about each
other instruction the court gave. And the Committee
was quite satisfied that its general cautionary instruc­
tion, which includes a warning that the court is not
giving any indication of how it feels about the merits
of the case, would be quite sufficient for the problem.
Again and again the Committee has rejected famil­
iar instructions on the grounds that they singled out
particular items of evidence. Let me give just two
examples. The Committee has rejected an instruction
cautioning the jury that the testimony of an employee
of the defendant is not to be disregarded simply be­
cause it is the testimony of an employee of the de­
fendant (see for example, BAJI No. 303E). Here the
Committee has followed a policy of relying on one
good general instruction on credibility and of reject­
ing the many advisory instructions now in circulation
which high light a particular problem of credibility.
A second example of this general point is the instruc­
tion telling the jury that flight from the scene of an
accident is not decisive one way or another as evidence
of negligence (see for example, BAJI No. 158B). Here
again, the instruction has the vice of singling out a
particular item of evidence and calling it to the jury's
attention, although in form the instruction does no
more than tell the jury it may consider this item along
with all the other evidence in the case. I might note
in passing that the Committee completed several
drafts of this instruction before it finally rejected it
altogether and that we did not reject it until we had
prepared a draft which we all regarded as superior to
any existing instruction on the topic.
Let me bring this to a. close with one more cluster
of examples on a point which has again been of major
importance to us. The Committee has drafted in a
general form a careful definition of negligence, and
it has steadfastly resolved against specific instructions
stating a standard of care under particular circum­
stances. It has, I think, quite sensibly taken the posi­
tion that these instructions add nothing to the sub­
stance of the general negligence instruction and serve
merely to clutter up and confuse the instruction field
by over particularizing instructions in one area. Thus
the following instruction, which is once again taken
from BAJI (222B), is a good example of the kind of
effort to particularize the standard of care which the
Committee is rejecting:
The rider in a vehicle being driven by another has the
duty to exercise ordinary care for [his] [or] [her] own
safety. This duty, however, does not necessarily require
the rider to interfere in any way with the handling of the
vehicle by the driver or to give or attempt to give the
driver advice, instructions, warnings or protests. Indeed,
it would be possible for a rider to commit negligence by
interfering with or disturbing the driver.
In the absence of indications to the contrary, either ap­
parent to the rider or that would be apparent to [him]
[or] [her] in the exercise of ordinary care, the rider who
[himself] [herself] if not negligent has a right to assume
that the driver will operate the vehicle with ordinary care.
However, due care generally requires of the rider that
[he] [or] [she] protest against obvious negligence of the
driver, if he has reasonable opportunity to do so.
[Also if the rider has superior knowledge over the driv­
er of conditions that relate to the possibility of accident
or the encountering of hazard,] [or] [if the driver has
made it known to the rider that [he] [or] [she], the driver,
depends on the rider for any specified assistance,] the rider
may be bound, in the exercise of ordinary care, to conduct
[himself] [or] [herself] in a manner that would not be
required in the absence of such [a] fact[s].]
But the manner in which the rider must conduct him­
self to comply with the duty to exercise ordinary care de­
pends on the particular circumstances of each case: and
in the light of all those circumstances, the jury must deter­
mine whether or not the rider acted as a person of ordinary
prudence.
III
In conclusion let me say a word now about the
format. You may be wondering how a record of the
Committee's thinking will be preserved in the cases
where it has recommended against an instruction al­
together. The Committee has decided that its nega­
tive recommendations are sufficiently important to
warrant some care in providing a permanent record
of them and in keeping them visible to the bench and
to the bar. In each case where we recommend against
the substance of an instruction, we will devote a full
page to it. The page will contain a full descriptive
title of the instruction, making it easy to locate. Next
it will contain a summary of what instructions of this
type cover but it will not offer a full draft. Finally it
will have an editorial note by the Committee sum­
marizing the Committee's reason for recommending
against the instruction. Thus where the Committee
has vetoed, it should not be difficult to quickly find
out that it has done so and what its reasons have been.
I come then to the final question: What impact and
weight will the Committee's negative recommenda­
tions have on trial practice in Illinois? This is of
course not an easy question for us to answer, and in
the last analysis will depend a good deal on you.
However as you might guess from the note of pride
that has been in my voice throughout, we do have
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some impressions which lead us to hope that our
negative work, like our affirmative work, will be help­
ful and influential. It will we think lead to a kind of
treaty between counsel where each will be glad to
follow our example and reduce the number of instruc­
tions provided there was some pressure on the oppos­
ing party to do the same. We think also it will
strengthen the hand of the trial judge when he wishes
to reject a given instruction as unnecessary or as
partisan. We think it will make it easier for him to
refuse to offset one bad instruction with another.
In the end the work of the Committee in eliminating
instructions will not of course solve all of the instruc­
tion problems of a trial judge. He will continue to
have major areas in which to exercise discretion and
he will continue to be the key man in the administra­
tion of justice. But it will more than repay the Com­
mittee for the many hours they have put in, if their
work will serve to make his important job somewhat
easier.
First United States
Atomic Energy Commission Citation
Casper W. Ooms, distinguished alumnus and mem­
ber of the Law School Visiting Committee has been
awarded the first United States Atomic Energy Com­
mission Citation. The Citation reads:
"To CASPER WILLIAM OOMS, ESQ., Dis­
tinguished member of the United States Patent Bar, in
recognition by the United States Atomic Energy Com­
mission for his outstanding participation in, and
meritorious contribution to, the mission of the Com­
mission in his capacity as a member and chairman of
the Commission's Patent Compensation Board since
its inception in 1947, during which period he has
rendered outstanding and devoted service to the
Commission and to his country in an activity which
vitally affects the national defense and the civilian
atomic energy program."
The Chief Justice of the United States addressing the dinner which followed the laying of the cornerstone of the new Law Build­
ings, May 28, 1958.
